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This paper reviews the demands of developing countries in the new round of WTO 
agricultural negotiations which began in Geneva in March 2000 based on the 
submissions to the Special Session up to November 2000.  Two issues of principle 
are identified.  The first is the developing country demand for equality of outcomes 
in the negotiations, and not just equality of commitments.  Because developed 
countries made the most use of agricultural support and protection in the past, 
developing countries argue that equal reduction commitments would still leave a 
very lop-sided playing-field in which the great bulk of support and protection would 
continue to be provided by the developed countries.  The second issue concerns the 
role and content of special and differential treatment (SDT) in the current round.  The 
paper notes the need for specific proposals under this heading, but warns that too 
much flexibility could encourage developing countries down a road which Europe 
has found leads to costly and poorly-targeted systems of support. 
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   1 
Introduction 
The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) significantly 
strengthened the disciplines and rules applying to the agricultural trade and domestic 
support policies of WTO Members.  Furthermore, Article 20 of the Agreement 
committed Members one year before the end of its implementation period, i.e. by 1 
January 2000, to start negotiations to continue the reform process designed to 
achieve the long-term objective of substantial progressive reductions in support and 
protection resulting in fundamental reform.  These negotiations should take into 
account:
1 
•  the experience to date from implementing the reduction commitments agreed in 
the Uruguay Round; 
•  the effects of these reduction commitments on world trade in agriculture; 
•  the objective to establish a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading system 
•  non-trade concerns, including food security and the need to protect the 
environment; 
•  special and differential treatment to developing country Members, including 
provision by the developed countries for a greater improvement of opportunities 
and terms of access for agricultural products of particular interest to these 
Members; 
•  the possible negative effects of the implementation of the reform programme on 
least-developed and net food-importing developing countries; 
•  the further commitments necessary to achieve these long-term objectives. 
A Special Session of the WTO Committee on Agriculture established by the 
General Council to conduct these negotiations for continuing the reform process held 
its first meeting on 23-24 March 2000.  Further meetings were held in June, 
September and November 2000 and the next meeting is planned in February 2001 in 
advance of the March 2001 stock-taking meeting.  The likely length of the 
negotiating process is unclear.  The issue is complicated by the views of some 
countries (including Japan and the EU) that the negotiations on agriculture (and the 
other items on the WTO’s so-called built-in agenda, including services and TRIPS) 
should be bundled into a wider, relaunched Millenium Round of trade negotiations.  
Although discussions on a wider round have continued since the abortive attempt to 
launch a Millenium Round in Seattle in November 1999, there is as yet no agreement   2 
that one should be initiated.  Insistence on linking the two could significantly 
postpone a successful outcome to the agricultural talks.  Hanging over the 
agricultural negotiations is the Due Restraint clause (Article 13 of the URAA, also 
known as the ‘peace clause’) which largely protects domestic and export subsidies 
which conform to the URAA disciplines from countervailing action until the end of 
2003.  After that date, in the absence of a new agreement, it will be open to Members 
to challenge the use of such subsidies by other Members regardless of their Uruguay 
Round status. 
 
The importance of agricultural trade reform to developing countries 
This paper addresses the interests of developing countries in the ongoing 
negotiations.  A question to be asked at the outset is whether these negotiations are 
important to the developing countries.  One answer to this question is given, in part, 
by the active participation of developing countries in the Special Session meetings 
which have been held to date.  Model simulations also suggest that the greatest 
welfare gains to developing countries from trade liberalisation arise in the agriculture 
and food sector (Anderson 1999).  Results of a simulation run with the Global Trade 
Analysis Project model (Hertel 1997) using the Version 4 database based on 1995 
data are presented in Table 1.  The simulation compares the results of removing all 
trade distortions in 2005 to the results of a base run of the model projecting the 
global economy forward to 2005 assuming the continuation of post-Uruguay Round 
trade interventions.  The model results suggest liberalisation would increase global 
welfare by US$260 billion per year.  This is undoubtedly an underestimate of the 
aggregate gains from trade liberalisation for a number of reasons.  Liberalisation in 
services trade and government procurement policies is excluded;  no account is taken 
of the benefits of increasing the degree of competition and the scope for scale 
economies; and the dynamic effects of reform are not captured.  On the assumption, 
however, that these omissions may not greatly affect the relative gains from 
reforming the various markets for goods, the author focuses on the relative 
contribution from liberalising different sectors. 
The distribution of this gain across regions and sectors shows absolute gains 
to developing countries amounting to US$108 billion.  Almost half (48 per cent) of 
the estimated global gains from goods trade liberalisation would come from 
agricultural reform in OECD countries. The developing countries’ stake in continued   3 
farm policy reform is shown by the contribution of OECD agricultural policy 
liberalisation to their overall welfare gain.  Farm trade reform in the OECD countries 
contributes just over one-quarter of the total welfare gains to developing countries 
from developed countries liberalising their merchandise trade (US$12bn of the total 
US$43bn).   
As is usual in these simulations, most of the gain arises from a region’s own 
liberalisation.  If developing countries were also to liberalise their agricultural 
policies, they would reap three quarters of the benefits (US$31bn of the agricultural 
policy reform gain of US$43bn), and those policies would contribute almost half of 
the gains from these countries’ overall merchandise trade reform (US$31bn of the 
US$65bn total).  Taking both sets of distortions together, farm and food policies 
globally contribute 40 per cent (US$43) of the US$108bn cost to developing 
economies of global goods trade distortions.  Hence the conclusion that developing 
countries as a group have a major stake in continuing the process of farm policy 
reform (Anderson 1999).   
A number of caveats should be borne in mind in interpreting these figures.  
The conclusion may exaggerate the importance of the WTO negotiations insofar as 
the developing countries’ own reform gains could be obtained through unilateral 
action.  If one examines the impact on developing countries of liberalisation by high 
income countries alone, then the share of the gains contributed by agricultural trade 
liberalisation amounts to $12 billion out of a total $43 billion, or around 30 per cent.  
Estimates of this kind are sensitive to the quality of the database used on trade flows, 
trade barriers and behavioural parameters as well as on the modelling strategy 
adopted.  However, the broad orders of magnitude of the overall importance of 
agricultural and food trade liberalisation to developing countries are not surprising, 
given the relatively higher protection rates found in this sector and the significance of 
agriculture and agricultural exports in the economies of low-income countries.   
Further, the figures discussed are aggregate gains to developing countries as a 
group.  Developing countries, however, do not necessarily have common interests in 
these negotiations.  At least five different groupings might be distinguished.
2  They 
include the major agricultural exporters such as Brazil, Argentina, Thailand and other 
developing country members of the Cairns group;  large low-income countries close 
to self-sufficiency, such as India;  large and medium-sized net food-importing 
developing countries, such as Egypt, Kenya, Pakistan;  the small island states which   4 
also belong to the net food-importing developing country category, including 
Mauritius and Jamaica, most if not all of which benefit from preferential trade 
arrangements with developed countries; and the least-developed countries also with a 
net food-importing status.  Food exporters and importers, and high- and low-potential 
food producers, are affected differently by food trade liberalisation and the 
introduction of disciplines on domestic agricultural trade and support policies and 
would be expected to pursue different agendas in the negotiations.   
One way in which these potentially conflicting interests have been reconciled 
in the past is through the use of Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) for 
developing countries.  SDT means not only that developing countries may be given 
more time to adjust to the introduction of new trade rules, but also that the rules 
themselves applying to developing countries may well be different.  In this paper, I 
want to explore the ways in which SDT can act to maintain the unity of developing 
countries in the agricultural trade negotiations, while at the same time highlighting 
some of the pitfalls and controversies surrounding its use.  One of the issues for 
developing countries in these negotiations is how far to push for exemptions and 
special treatment, knowing that the freedom to intervene in agricultural markets can 
potentially incur high costs. 
 
Developing countries’ recent experience in agricultural trade 
The current negotiations should take into account the effect of the Uruguay 
Round reduction commitments on world trade in agriculture.  Implementation of the 
Agreement was expected to lead to a structural change in world food markets 
whereby food production would shift from highly subsidised regions to low-
subsidised or non-subsidised regions.  If the Uruguay Round negotiating outcome 
had provided for a greater improvement of opportunities and terms of access for 
agricultural products of particular interest to developing countries, one would also 
expect to see a relative improvement in the growth of developing country agricultural 
exports.  From the point of view of developing country importers, their fear was that 
the URAA would lead to higher world market prices and reductions in subsidised 
exports (including food aid) which would have negative effects on their food 
security.  This section reviews agricultural trade data to examine to what extent these 
expectations or fears were fulfilled.  The main difficulty in assessing the actual 
impact of the URAA commitments is that the time period for which data is available   5 
(1994-98) is relatively short and is heavily influenced by special factors (the 1995-96 
price spike in world cereal markets and the Asian crisis in 1997-98). 
Agricultural exports of developing countries have expanded more rapidly 
than those of developed countries.
3  As a result, the share of developing countries in 
world agricultural exports, which had increased from 40 to 41½ per cent between 
1990 and 1994, reached 42½ per cent in 1998.  In the first three years of the 
implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreement, developing countries’ export 
growth was stronger than in the pre-WTO phase with an annual increase of 7.2 per 
cent for 1994-97 versus 6.1 per cent for 1990-94.  However, reflecting the impact of 
the Asian crisis in 1998, the corresponding figure for 1994-98 fell to 3.7 per cent 
(though still higher than for developed countries whose annual growth over the 1994-
98 period was just 2.0 per cent).   As the figures refer to all agricultural exports, 
including tropical products and raw materials, they do not necessarily reflect the 
performance of the commodities covered specifically by the URAA.   
The growth of imports into developed countries alone should minimise the 
impact of the Asian crisis.  Developed country imports of food from developing 
countries between 1990-94 grew slightly faster (7 per cent) than from all origins (5½ 
per cent) but at the same rate between both 1994-97 (4½ per cent) and 1994-98 (2½ 
per cent).  These figures do not suggest a relative improvement in the market access 
opportunities available to developing countries in developed country markets, 
although a more thorough analysis would need to control for differences in the 
commodity composition of imports and for the supply capacity of developing 
countries.
4 
As important as the growth of exports is the changing geographical 
composition of world agricultural trade.  In particular, developing countries’ import 
markets are becoming increasingly important as outlets for agricultural exports from 
other developing countries.  Around 40 per cent of developing country agricultural 
exports now go to other developing countries, as much as the import markets of 
Western Europe and North America combined.  Furthermore, developing country 
import markets are much more dynamic than developed ones.  Between 1990-98 
(1990-97 figures in brackets) they grew by 90 (108) per cent, compared to 38 (44) 
per cent for developed countries.  This underlines the importance, from a market 
access perspective, of developing countries’ own trade barriers.  Developing country 
exporters are relatively few and concentrated, however, in comparison to developing   6 
country importers, so it would not be surprising to find the importer perspective 
dominating developing country contributions to the WTO negotiations. 
Higher prices as a result of the URAA leading to difficulties in financing 
normal levels of commercial imports were a concern of developing country 
importers.  Indeed, data on non-fuel primary commodity prices show that prices were 
on an upward trend from 1992 onwards to reach a plateau of sorts between 1995-97.  
Since then, prices have been falling in nominal terms and also, if less rapidly, in real 
terms measured against the prices of manufactures exported by the industrial 
countries.  Focusing specifically on wheat prices, nominal prices peaked in 1995/96 
but have since fallen to their lowest level since 1990.  FAO reports that, by 1998/99, 
total expenditures for commercial cereal imports (not including food aid most of 
which is provided on grant terms) were slightly lower than in 1994/95 while the 
volume of commercial imports was 14 per cent higher.
5 In the absence of a specific 
counterfactual one cannot infer that the Uruguay Round has had no effect on world 
prices.  Nonetheless, to date there is no evidence that the Round ushered in a period 
of significantly stronger world market prices as some developing countries had 
feared. 
Developing country food aid recipients also feared that a rundown of 
government-held stocks would lead to reduced food aid shipments.  In the Marrakesh 
Decision
6 WTO Members agreed to establish appropriate mechanisms to ensure that 
the implementation of the URAA would not adversely affect the availability of food 
aid at a level which is sufficient to continue to provide assistance in meeting the food 
needs of developing countries, especially least-developed and net food-importing 
developing countries.  Again, the evidence concerning actual food aid flows over a 
relatively short period is ambiguous.  A number of donor countries pledge minimum 
food aid commitments under the Food Aid Convention.  Under the 1986 Convention, 
these commitments amounted to 7.517 million tonnes, reducing to 5.35 million 
tonnes (wheat equivalent) under the 1995 Convention and to 4.895 million tonnes 
under the 1999 Convention.  Actual food aid shipments fell from 10.4 million tonnes 
in 1992/93 to 5.8 million tonnes in 1996/97, although in all years except 1994/95 
they exceeded FAC members’ combined annual commitments.  Since then, FAC 
donor food shipments have recovered to 8.1 million tonnes in 1998/99 and to an 
estimated 8.3 million tonnes in 1999/2000.
7   7 
The more comprehensive data on food aid deliveries gathered by the World 
Food Programme (which includes FAC members, other countries and non-
governmental organisations) shows that global food aid deliveries reached a record 
17.3 million tonnes in 1993 and thereafter declined to 7.2 million tonnes in 1996.  
Deliveries have since increased, to reach 14.5 million tonnes in 1999.  This was 
mainly due to a sharp increase of deliveries to “other countries”.  Food aid deliveries 
to the two country groups singled out for particular attention in the Marrakesh 
Decision were lower over the implementation period than for a three-year average 
period prior to the URAA, although they had recovered by 1999.  These countries 
have argued, with some justification, that the apparent commitments they received in 
the Uruguay Round have not been implemented in a meaningful way.   
 
Developing countries’ experience of Uruguay Round commitments 
Market access 
Uruguay Round disciplines were introduced in the areas of market access, 
export subsidies and domestic support.  Prior to the Uruguay Round, only 55 per cent 
of agricultural tariffs in developed countries and 18 per cent in developing countries 
were bound.  Furthermore, tariff barriers were reinforced by the widespread use of 
non-tariff barriers (variable import levies, quotas, minimum import prices, voluntary 
export restraints, etc.).  The URAA mandated the tariffication of all previous 
agricultural trade barriers at the existing level of protection, the binding of these 
tariffs and their reduction by an average 36 per cent over the six-year implementation 
period.  Developing countries were allowed the option of binding “ceiling tariffs” 
which could be set at whatever level they choose and did not have to be based on 
tariff equivalent calculations.  Furthermore, they were only required to reduce these 
bindings by an average 21 per cent over a ten-year period (or not at all in the case of 
LDCs).  Many choose quite high levels even though, in practice, applied tariffs are 
often much lower.  For major agricultural products, developed countries’ tariffs are 
about twice as high as those of developing countries.
8 
Because it was foreseen that tariffication on its own, even with the 36 percent 
average reduction in bound tariffs, might not create much additional market access, 
the URAA introduced tariff rate quotas (TRQs) in those situations where tariffs 
replaced non-tariff barriers.  The TRQ quantities are set at 5 per cent of domestic 
consumption at the end of the implementation period (4 per cent for developing   8 
countries), while current access quotas were bound at their 1986-88 levels.  TRQs are 
mainly a feature of developed country schedules because few developing countries 
engaged in tariffication.  WTO figures show utilisation rates of just over 60 per cent 
in the period 1995-98 for all agricultural products for which TRQs were opened.  
Some of these TRQs merely incorporated existing import commitments from 
developing countries under preferential arrangements, and the amount of new market 
access created for developing countries by these arrangements has been small. 
  
Export subsidies 
Developed countries agreed to reduce by 36 per cent the value of export 
subsidies from their 1986-90 base level and to cut the quantity of subsidised exports 
by 21 per cent over six years.  For developing countries, the reduction commitments 
are two-thirds of those applying to developed countries, and the implementation 
period is extended to ten years.  No reductions were required of LDCs.  Equally 
important, the URAA prohibits the use of new export subsidies where they are not 
reported in a country’s Schedule as having existed in the base period.  Bona fide food 
aid is excluded from these disciplines. 
Only 27 WTO Members reported the use of export subsidies, of which just 10 
were developing countries.  In value terms, developed countries (and particularly the 
EU) account for the vast bulk of subsidised exports provided.  Developing countries 
thus have little interest in a continuation of this support mechanism. 
 
Domestic support 
One of the significant achievements of the Uruguay Round was the 
recognition that production subsidies to agriculture constituted a potential trade 
distortion and thus should be regulated in the Agreement on Agriculture.  Domestic 
subsidies are divided into three types.  Those which are exempt from reduction 
because they are deemed to be non-, or minimally, trade-distorting are placed in the 
Green Box.  Such supports include publicly-financed R&D, early retirement 
schemes for farmers and payments for long-term land retirement.  Under SDT 
provisions (sometimes referred to as the Development Box), developing countries 
are also allowed to exempt from reduction commitments investment subsidies 
generally available to agriculture;  agricultural input subsidies generally available to 
low-income or resource-poor developing country producers; and anti-narcotic   9 
diversification incentives.  A further category of schemes exempt from reduction of 
interest mainly to developed countries comprising direct payments under ‘production 
limiting’ programmes was placed in the Blue Box.   
Remaining subsidies must be counted towards a country’s Aggregate 
Measure of Support unless exempted under de minimis provisions.  These allow 
support for a particular product to be exempted if that support is not greater than 5 
per cent of its value of production (10 per cent for developing countries) or non-
product specific support if it is less than 5 per cent of the total value of agricultural 
production (10 per cent for developing countries).  The remaining support included 
in a country’s Base Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) was to be reduced by 20 
percent over a six year period.  This reduction commitment was 13.3 per cent over a 
ten year period for developing countries and zero for the LDCs. 
Examination of Table 2 shows that the Green Box is used most frequently by 
a small group of developed countries.  Developing countries make the criticism that 
its provisions are too vague and provide leeway for abuse by those who can afford to 
provide outright financial supports, but that it is too narrow for the purposes of 
addressing developing countries’ non-trade concerns such as food security and 
protection of small farmers’ livelihoods. 
This review of Uruguay Round commitments shows that there is far from 
being a level playing field between developed and developing countries in terms of 
the provision of agricultural support and protection.  Because developed countries 
entered the Uruguay Round negotiations with much higher levels of support, despite 
the greater reduction commitments they took on, they still account for the lion’s 
share of support.  This observation raises the meaning of equal burden-sharing in the 
negotiations.  Should this be interpreted as equality in commitments which, given the 
inequality in initial positions, must inevitably lead to inequality in outcomes?  Or 
conversely, should it be interpreted as achieving equality in outcomes, even where 
this would mean differential burden-sharing in terms of commitments.  There is 
evidence already in these negotiations that some participants favour this second 
approach.  The United States, for example, in its proposal on domestic support, has 
proposed that all countries move to a common ceiling on domestic support 
(expressed as a share of the value of agricultural production) by the end of the 
implementation period of any agreement emerging from this negotiating round.   
Similarly, many countries propose that there may agreement on maximum allowable   10 
tariff levels at the end of the next round, regardless of initial levels.  Finally, the 
proposal put forward by many countries to eliminate export subsidies by the end of 
the round would, de facto, also result in an equality of outcome in this area too. 
 
Negotiating issues 
This section examines the position of developing countries with respect to the 
concrete issues under discussion in these negotiations, including market access, 




Developing countries are agreed on the broad parameters for tariff reduction in 
the current round.
9  They cover four main areas: 
•  a substantial reduction in average tariff levels.  No country has as yet made a 
concrete proposal on the average size of tariff reduction to be achieved.  A 
reduction of a further one-third, the reduction agreed in the Uruguay Round, 
might be considered a minimum target.  The significance of such a reduction 
would depend on whether it was applied to the Uruguay Round base period or 
final tariff bindings.  If there was agreement on maximum levels of permitted 
tariffs at the end of the current round, this could imply different average 
reduction levels for individual countries depending on their initial starting 
positions. 
•  a substantial reduction or elimination of disparities in tariff levels. Countries 
could decide to follow the Uruguay Round precedent of setting an average 
reduction target and allowing countries to meet this target by implementing lower 
reductions for some commodities compensated by higher tariff cuts for others.  
This option would exacerbate the existing dispersion of tariff rates across 
commodities.  Even an across-the-board linear reduction would leave many of 
the existing tariff peaks in agriculture.  If an attempt is made to harmonise tariff 
rates, then something like the Swiss formula which was used in the Tokyo Round 
to harmonise tariff peaks on industrial products could be used.
10  The point of the 
Swiss formula is that it leads to greater percentage reductions in higher tariffs 
than in lower ones as well as setting a ceiling on maximum tariff levels.   11 
•  a substantial reduction in tariff escalation.  Although this issue has been 
highlighted in previous trade rounds, it continues to adversely affect processing 
activities in developing countries.  The solution is to ensure that tariff levels on 
imports of processed commodities are not higher than those imposed on the 
import of raw materials (which are often zero), and developing countries will 
want to see significant progress in this direction in the current round. 
•  greater transparency and less complexity in tariff structures.  This last issue refers 
to whether tariffs are denominated on a specific, ad valorem or mixed basis.  The 
denomination of tariffs on a specific basis results in lack of transparency and 




Tariff quotas and preferential access 
Developing countries have called for the simplification of the administration of 
tariff rate quotas and that they should be made more transparent and equitable for all 
trading partners. Tariff quotas are of particular importance to the group of developing 
countries with preferential access to developed country markets.  These exporters 
will experience losses from further tariff reductions in OECD markets, although 
these would have to be weighed against the potential gains from improved market 
access in other products and in other markets.  It would be desirable to find ways of 
compensating these exporters for the erosion of these rents.  Some compensation 
could be provided if tariff reductions were accompanied by increased market access 
by enlarging the TRQs, though this would only benefit efficient exporters who could 
recoup some of their losses through increased sales.   Direct financial aid for 
diversification will also be important although, because preferential agreements had 
no standing in the WTO, it will be difficult to argue for a multilateral as opposed to 
bilateral commitment on this issue.   
 
Developing country tariff levels 
Developing country importers are less enthusiastic about pursuing large cuts in 
agricultural bound tariffs, despite the conclusions of the model simulations which 
suggest that this is the most important route to significant gains.  For some countries, 
the loss of tariff revenue is a consideration.  The continuation of special and 
differential treatment allowing developing countries to commit to a smaller   12 
percentage tariff reduction over a longer time period is one possible option.  A more 
audacious proposal has been made by some developing countries that, in order to be 
able to promote domestic food production as a means to greater food security, 
developing countries should be able to raise tariff bindings on food staples, or 
alternatively that a positive list approach would be adopted under which WTO tariff 
disciplines would only apply to those products where developing countries wanted 
this.  This attempt to reverse existing moves to liberalisation has been sharply 
rebuked by the EU as well as by a number of developing country exporters, but it 
does serve to remind us of the strength of feeling on this issue. 
Few developing countries make use of the full extent of the protection permitted 
in their Schedules.  However, high ceilings have the advantage that countries are not 
constrained in altering tariff rates in order to stabilise domestic farm prices in the 
face of low world prices.  While the abolition of variable protection should, in 
theory, lead to more stable world prices, developing countries will be reluctant to 
forego this instrument until they have more confidence in the stability of the world 
market.  Thus, there is a case that the use of variable tariff (price band) schemes 
might be placed under SDT and only allowed to developing countries.  Developing 
countries have also argued that the right to make use of the Special Safeguard clause 
should be similarly confined to developing countries.  The clause establishes 
conditions which allow temporary duty increases above the bound levels based on 
either a price-based or a quantity-based trigger.  Current rules only permit its use by 
countries which have undergone tariffication (i.e. developed countries) where a 
formal designation has been made in a country’s Schedule.   
 
Sanitary and Phtyosanitary (SPS) barriers 
Although not part of the ongoing negotiations on agricultural trade liberalisation, 
SPS measures are an increasingly important trade barrier to developing country 
agricultural exports.  A major problem is that there is a lack of mutual recognition of 
inspections and standards.  Major importing countries tend to demand ‘sameness’ in 
the process, rather than ‘equivalence’.  Where equivalence agreements have been 
entered into, they are all among developed countries.  The arbitrariness of different 
standards is suggested by the data that, of the 135 countries which are WTO 
members, 15 are currently allowed to export fresh, chilled or frozen poultry meat to 
the EC, five may export to the US, one to Canada and none are allowed to export to   13 
Australia.
12  The lack of technical and financial resources to implement the stringent 
standards being demanded for food imports, or even to play a significant role in the 
standard-setting process, are huge problems for developing countries and there has 
been little evidence of concrete assistance from developed countries, as promised 
under the SPS Agreement. 
 
Export subsidies 
Most developing countries share the views of the Cairns Group which has called 
for the complete elimination of export subsidies over a period of time.  These 
countries argue that the use of export subsidies by a small number of countries, by 
depressing and destabilising international market prices, lowers farm incomes in 
other exporting countries and harms local production in food-importing countries. 
There are some importing developing countries which feel that they currently 
benefit from export subsidies through access to cheaper imports.
13  These benefits, 
though, are very unreliable.  Export subsidies are high when world food prices are 
low anyway, and disappear when world food prices are high when food-importing 
countries have most need of support (Tangermann and Josling 1999).   
The Cairns group has proposed that SDT could include a longer implementation 
time frame for developing countries for those few developing countries which make 
use of export subsidies, as well as the extension of the existing special exemptions 
for developing countries under Article 9.4 of the Agreement.
14  This Article exempts 
developing countries from undertaking commitments in respect of subsidies to 
reduce the cost of marketing exports of agricultural products or of subsidies to 
provide more favourable internal transport and freight charges on export compared to 
domestic shipments.  Under Article 8 of the Agreement countries undertake not to 
provide export subsidies otherwise than in conformity with the Agreement and with 
the commitments as specified in that country’s schedule.  This is interpreted to imply 
that countries which did not use export subsidies in the base period and declare them 
in their schedule of notifications will not be allowed to introduce them in the future.  
As developing countries were not required to make a commitment for these two 
particular types of export subsidy, this would appear to give them the flexibility to 
introduce them in the future even if they did not use them in the past. 
   14 
Other export supports 
The future of export subsidies is closely tied to the incorporation of disciplines on 
other forms of export support.  In particular, the EU has indicated it is prepared to 
show flexibility on export subsidies provided rules are extended to cover indirect 
export subsidisation through export credits, state trading export boards and the abuse 
of food aid. 
In the URAA the provision of export credits was defined as a form of export 
subsidy, but no agreement was reached on constraints.  Within the OECD, countries 
have negotiated a code for non-agricultural export credits which puts limits on credit 
terms and the length of credit extension but agriculture is not yet included in this 
agreement.  The obvious way to deal with this is to define allowable credit terms and 
to charge more generous terms against a country’s export subsidies schedule.  Again, 
some importing developing countries feel they benefit from the availability of these 
credits and may be reluctant to agree to a tightening of the rules, unless a more 
effective mechanism to protect them from food price increases in the future can be 
agreed.   
Further export subsidy issues include the role of state trading exporters (single 
desk sellers) given the potential for cross-subsidisation and the role of two-price 
schemes (such as the EU’s sugar regime) where high consumer support on the 
domestic market may indirectly cross-subsidise exports to the world market. 
Article 10.4 contains rules on food aid transactions.  Food aid should not be tied 
directly or indirectly to commercial exports, transactions should conform to the FAO 
Principles of Surplus Disposal and food aid should be provided to the fullest extent 
possible in grant form or on highly concessional terms.  Food aid volumes increased 
substantially in the period 1997-99 when cereal prices were falling, and some donors 
(EU) believe that food aid is used to clear surplus stocks in donor countries as well as 
promoting market development.  It proposes that the conditions and forms of food 
aid transactions should be discussed in WTO. 
 
Export taxes 
The converse of export subsidies – export taxes and controls – received relatively 
little attention in the Uruguay Round.  Article XI of GATT 1947 prohibits 
quantitative export restrictions but makes an explicit exception for “export 
prohibitions or restrictions temporarily applied to prevent or relieve critical shortages   15 
of foodstuffs or other products essential to the exporting contracting party”.  Article 
12 of the URAA tightens this a little by calling on Members, with respect to new 
restrictions on foodstuffs, to give “due consideration” to the food security concerns 
of importing countries and requires adequate notice and consultation prior to 
implementation.  Developing countries are exempt from these provisions unless they 
are regular food exporters.   
The US has proposed the prohibition of export taxes for competitive advantage or 
supply management purposes.  However, some developing countries believe they 
need to retain the use of export taxes for supply management purposes.
15  But there is 
an inconsistency in expecting importers to open their markets to trade and then 
withholding exports from the market in times of shortage.  In the interests of a 




The main concern of developing countries under this heading is that their 
commitments should not make it more difficult to pursue desired food security and 
rural development policies.  Only 20 developing countries reported positive Total 
Base AMS and, of these, only 12 reported Total Base AMS above the 10 per cent de 
minimis allowed.
16  Thus, for the great majority of developing countries, their ability 
to provide direct subsidies to agriculture in future under current rules will depend 
either on these being exempt under the SDT or de minimis provisions.     
The future of domestic support disciplines is tied up with attitudes to non-
trade concerns. Non-trade concerns should be taken into account in the negotiations.  
Food security and the environment are specifically mentioned in this connection in 
the Uruguay Round Agreement, although some developed countries also wish to 
extend the concept to include rural development and animal welfare. The EU, among 
others, would like to see the ‘multifunctionality’ of agriculture recognised and 
production-linked support allowed where it is targeted on these objectives.   
At least four options are open to developing countries under this heading: 
•  to agree to a general widening of exempt subsidies in the Green Box to cover 
non-trade concerns 
•  to widen SDT exemptions under the Green Box   16 
•  to seek higher de minimis levels of non-exempt subsidies under the AMS 
•  to allow negative AMS to be explicitly set off against positive AMS.   
Developing countries are unlikely to have the budgetary resources to embark on 
such programmes and should be wary of allowing the developed countries to proceed 
down this route.  Some existing payments of this kind (e.g. the EU’s agri-
environment scheme) appear to compensate farmers for adopting less 
environmentally damaging production practices in a reversal of the polluter-pays 
principle.  More generally, opening the opportunity for production-linked subsidies 
may simply result in the replacement of one category of trade-distorting measures by 
another. 
SDT exemptions currently comprise investment and input subsidies and aid for 
diversifying away from narcotic crops.  Given the exemptions for general 
government subsidies, it is not clear what further relief might be sought.  Developing 
countries might seek to be allowed to continue Blue Box supports even if these are 
denied to developed countries.  However, given the budgetary situation in developing 
countries, direct payments to farmers are unlikely to be a significant policy 
instrument, especially compared to the attractions of tariff protection. 
Some developing countries have suggested that de minimis levels be raised to 20 
per cent of the value of output for developing countries under SDT.  Higher de 
minimis levels provide greater flexibility in the choice of policy instruments.   
For some countries, the same objective of increased room for manoeuvre could 
be provided by allowing negative AMS to be offset in calculating a country’s Total 
AMS.  Negative AMS arises where domestic prices are below external reference 
prices.  The Agreement does not discipline taxation of production and negative AMS 
is ignored in calculating the AMS level.  The attraction to developing countries is 
that the AMS is aggregated over all commodities, so allowing negative AMS (for 
example, on export crops) to be included would permit greater support to be given to 
other production (for example, food crops).  Whether this remains an important issue 
will depend on attitudes to export taxation in general in a new agreement.   17 
 
Negative effects of reform on least developed and net food importing 
countries 
To deal with the potential adverse indirect effects of higher world market 
food prices on low income and net food importing countries, the URAA was 
accompanied by a Decision on Measures Concerning The Possible Negative Effects 
of the Reform Programme on Least-Developed Countries and Net Food-Importing 
Developing Countries (NFIDCs).  The main problem addressed by the Decision is 
the fear that the LDCs and NFIDCs may face difficulty in accessing adequate 
supplies of basic foodstuffs from external sources on reasonable terms, including 
financing.  It mentions four specific responses to this difficulty: food aid; favourable 
treatment with export credits; concessional financing for food imports; and technical 
and financial assistance to increase agricultural productivity and production.  
Few practical consequences have followed from the Decision to date, 
reflecting its non-legally-binding nature.  In the case of food aid, a new Food Aid 
Convention (FAC) was concluded in 1999 which actually lowered the minimum 
guaranteed quantities donors intend to provide. On export credits, no agreement has 
been reached on how assistance might be provided.  As regards financing facilities, 
the Decision recognises that the two groups of countries facing difficulties “may be 
eligible to draw on the resources” of existing facilities of the international financial 
institutions, or such new facilities as may be established.  But most of the Decision 
countries already have access to these resources, and there has been no enthusiasm to 
set up a further facility. In any case, encouraging already heavily-indebted countries 
to borrow further to finance food imports hardly makes sense. Finally, on aid 
programmes, the Decision does not bind any country nor give any specific guideline 
on how “full consideration” is to be given to requests for technical and financial 
assistance to improve their agricultural productivity and infrastructure.   
Some improvement in what is on offer to these countries will be a necessary 
ingredient to gain their support in the next round.  Some countries would like 
eligibility for assistance to become automatic when world market prices rise above a 
certain level.  On food aid, one of the criticisms of present policies is the tendency 
for food aid volumes to decrease when world prices increase and anticipated needs 
are greatest.  Specific possibilities for improvement include writing food aid   18 
commitments, and indeed technical and financial assistance commitments, into 
country Schedules rather than leaving them simply as exhortations as at present. 
 
Conclusions 
Developing countries have demonstrated a strong interest in the new round of  
agricultural trade negotiations, and have taken an active part in presenting proposals 
in these early stages.  From the point of view of the developed countries, and the EU 
in particular which has called for a new round to be a development round, two issues 
are of particular importance. 
The first is the developing country demand for equality of outcomes in the 
negotiations, and not just equality of commitments.  They have argued that, because 
the developed countries made the most use of agricultural support and protection in 
the past, equal reduction commitments still leave a very lop-sided playing-field in 
which the great bulk of support and protection continues to be provided by the 
developed countries.  The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture did make some 
small concessions to this principle, in that the reduction commitments taken on by 
developing countries were, on average, around two-thirds of those of the developed 
countries.  However, as the experience in implementing these commitments has 
demonstrated, this was far from sufficient to eliminate the disparities in support.  In 
making this demand, developing countries have some powerful allies among the low-
subsidising developed countries, so it is clear that the demand for equality of 
outcomes is not just a North-South issue. 
The second issue is, however, specific to developing countries and concerns 
the role and content of special and differential treatment in the current round.   
Developing countries have made clear that they want SDT to mean more than simply 
a longer time period in which to adjust to new trade and domestic support disciplines, 
and that it should embrace more favourable improvements in market access and 
greater flexibility in providing domestic support and protection than permitted to 
developed countries in any new agreement. 
Developed countries have indicated that, in principle, they accept the 
principle of SDT.  The EU supports SDT and has called for tariff free treatment to 
essentially all imports from the least developed countries.
17 The US has promised to 
give “special consideration for exempt support measures essential to the 
development objectives of developing countries”.  However, the additional specific   19 
criteria it proposes “to facilitate the development of targeted programs to increase 
investment and improve infrastructure, enhance domestic marketing systems, help 
farmers manage risk, provide access to new technologies promoting sustainability 
and resource conservation and increase productivity of subsistence producers” will 
not be broad enough for many developing countries.
18   The Cairns Group also 
proposes enhanced Green Box measures for developing countries which would 
address their specific concerns regarding food security, rural development and 
poverty eradication.
19  What is needed at this stage is more specific suggestions from 
developing countries on what additional exemptions they consider necessary under 
this heading. 
While agreement should be possible on developed country market access and 
on domestic support issues, the demand by some developing countries to be allowed 
to maintain, and even to increase, protection for domestic food production if they 
wish to is much more problematic.  And not only for developed countries, as many 
developing country exporters are aware of the growing importance of developing 
country markets.  While the call to allow developing countries flexibility to pursue 
their food security objectives may appear persuasive, we should not encourage 
developing countries down a road which we, in Europe, have found leads to costly 
and poorly-targeted systems of support. 
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High  income          
 High  income  110.5  -0.0  -5.7  -8.1  96.6 
 Low  income  11.6  0.1  9.0  22.3  43.1 
 Total  122.1  0.0  3.3  14.2  139.7 
Low  income          
  High  income  11.2 0.2 10.5 27.7  49.6 
 Low  income  31.4  2.5  3.6  27.6  65.1 
  Total  42.6 2.7 14.1 55.3  114.7 
All  countries          
 High  income  121.7  0.1  4.8  19.6  146.2 
  Low  income  43.0 2.7 12.6 49.9  108.1 
 Total  164.7  2.8  17.4  69.5  254.3 
Source:  Anderson 1999 
 
 
Table 2: Total expenditure on Green Box measures, by member, 1995-6. 
Country 1995  1996 
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